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M ines	 and	 explosive	 remnants	 of	 war	 continue	 to	 affect	many	parts	of	 the	world.	One	 such	area	 is	 the	Horn	of	Africa,	where	wars	have	continued	for	the	better	part	of	
the	20th	 century.	U.N.	Security	Council	Resolution	1320	 formally	
established	 the	 United	 Nations	 Mission	 in	 Ethiopia	 and	 Eritrea	
in	November	 2000.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	U.N.	 Security	Council	
formally	 established	 a	 Mine	 Action	 Coordination	 Centre	 within	
the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Ethiopia	and	Eritrea.	The	resolution	
requires	the	MACC	to	coordinate	and	provide	technical	assistance	for	
humanitarian	mine	action	activities	in	the	TSZ1	[temporary	security	
zone]	and	area	adjacent	to	it.
History of the Mine and ERW Problem
The	mine	and	ERW	problems	of	Eritrea	and	Ethiopia	stem	from	
three	historical	periods.	Eritrea	was	colonised	by	the	Italians	in	the	
19th	 century.	 During	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Italian	 and	 British	
forces	 fought	 a	 number	 of	 battles	 across	 Eritrea,	 culminating	 in	 a	
major	siege	on	the	town	of	Keren	in	191,	which	lasted	nearly	three	
months.	These	battles	were	 fought	 in	a	conventional	manner,	 con-
sisting	of	 aerial	 bombardments,	 artillery,	 small-arms	fire	 and	mine	
emplacement.	Certain	areas	around	Keren	are	considered	hazardous	
today	due	to	suspected	contamination	by	mines	and	unexploded	ord-
nance,	particularly	in	the	hills	surrounding	the	township.	Keren	was	
the	scene	of	a	major	battle	again	during	the	independence	war	years	
between	1961	and	1991.
After	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Eritrea	 was	 governed	 by	 Great	
Britain	until	 the	early	190s,	when	 it	was	handed	over	 to	Ethiopia	
to	be	part	of	the	federation	system;	annexed	by	Ethiopia,	Eritrea	be-
came	its	northernmost	province.	There	was	a	resurgence	of	Eritrean	
nationalism	in	the	early	1960s	when	the	Eritrean	population	began	
Mines	and	ERW	
by Bob Kudyba [ UNMEE MACC ]
Due to the history and nature of conflicts in 
the Ethiopia/Eritrea area, cleanup presents 
specific considerations and hazards. The 
lessons learned by the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Mine Action 
Coordination Centre in mine/explosive 
rem-nants of war cleanup are presented, 
as well as recommendations on clearance 
operations for situations with mixed mine/
ERW like that in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
an	 insurgent	 campaign	 for	 independence	 against	Ethiopian	 forces.	
This	rebellion	gradually	developed	into	a	more	conventional	war	as	
the	Eritreans	gained	support	for	their	cause,	won	key	battles	and	held	
ground.	This	struggle	for	independence	lasted	30	years	and	affected	
the	entire	country.	The	Eritrean	struggle	for	independence	is	possibly	
one	of	the	most	successful	examples	of	a	liberation	war.	Eritreans	are	
justifiably	proud	of	the	establishment	of	their	country,	as	it	was	won	
at	great	cost	to	the	population	and	without	“outside”	help	or	support	
from	other	nations.
After	 the	 state	 of	 Eritrea	 was	 established	 in	 1993,	 following	 a	
U.N.-monitored	 referendum	 in	 which	 the	 population	 voted	 over-
whelmingly	for	independence,	the	relationship	between	Eritrea	and	
Ethiopia	was	cordial.	This	relationship	continued	until	several	issues	
soured	 it,	 including	 the	 introduction	of	a	new	currency,	 the	nakfa,	
which	replaced	the	Ethiopian	birr.	The	situation	eventually	deterio-
rated	into	a	war	lasting	from	199	to	2000	over	non-demarcated	bor-
ders.	Then	in	2000,	Algiers	brokered	a	peace	accord.	
This	 border	 war	 was	 an	 intense	 conflict,	 with	 both	 sides	 em-
ploying	 conventional	war	 strategies	 that	 developed	 into	 a	 carefully	
planned	and	executed	military	operation	reminiscent	of	World	War	I.	
The	war	was	fought	at	terrible	cost	with	an	estimated	70,000	people	
killed	and	thousands	more	displaced.	As	a	result	of	this	conflict,	the	
entire	border	area	between	the	two	countries	from	the	Sudan	in	the	
west	to	the	Djiboutian	border	in	the	east	remains	contaminated	with	
mines	and	ERW	today.
Interrelationship between Mines and ERW
As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 conflicts,	most	 of	Eritrea	 and	 the	northern	
areas	of	Ethiopia	remain	contaminated	with	mines	and	conventional	
ERW.	In	a	recent	incident,	a	truck	driver	collecting	stones	for	a	build-
ing	site	was	killed	when	his	vehicle	drove	over	a	landmine	on	a	vacant	
site	just	off	a	main	road	near	the	capital,	Asmara.	This	mine	was	a	
remnant	 of	 the	 independence	war	 years,	 quite	 possibly	 overlooked	
when	the	area	was	vacated.
In	examining	the	history	of	the	conflicts	that	have	engulfed	the	
region,	mines	and	ERW	are	interwoven	menaces	rather	than	separate	
entities.	 It	 is	 not	 safe	 to	 just	walk	 out	 to	 unexploded	 ordnance	 or	
an	abandoned	tank	and	attempt	to	remove	or	destroy	items	without	
operational	combat	failure	rates	of	U.S.	mu-
nitions.”27	 This	 is	 a	 remarkable	 admission	
because	it	has	broader	implications	than	just	
concerning	cluster	munitions.	But	consistent	
with	 nongovernmental	 organisation	 and	
field-based	evidence,	it	also	confirms	actual	
CBU	failure	rates	might	have	little	relation-
ship	with	official	“test”	claims.2
In	March	2006,	Timothy	McCormack,	a	
professor	of	international	humanitarian	law	
at	the	University	of	Melbourne	Law	School,	
led	a	review	of	the	responses	to	a	survey	by	
CCW	States	Parties	regarding	their	views	of	
the	relevance	of	IHL	principles	to	explosive	
remnants	 of	 war.	 McCormack	 concluded	
that	 the	CCW’s	Protocol	V	 should	be	 suf-
ficient	to	address	the	problem	of	ERW—but	
if	 not,	 and	 the	 problem	 “only	 increases	 in	
severity,”	the	call	for	a	ban	on	cluster	bombs	
should	 not	 be	 unexpected.	 Significantly,	
the	 report	 also	 argued	 that	 whatever	 the	
outcome,	 “the	 onus	 is	 on	 user	 states	 to	
demonstrate	that	such	weapons	can	be	used	
consistently	with	the	binding	obligations	of	
IHL”	(emphasis	added).29
The	 announcement	 that	 the	 Belgian	
government	 had	 adopted	 a	 comprehensive	
ban	 on	 cluster	 munitions	 sent	 a	 ripple	 of	
optimism	 through	 the	 Cluster	 Munition	
Coalition,	and	thanks	to	good	Belgian	tim-
ing,	it	arrived	just	in	advance	of	the	CCW	
meeting	of	States	Parties	in	March	2006.	In	
one	 swoop,	 the	Belgians	have	 changed	 the	
complexion	 of	 the	 cluster	 munitions	 cam-
paign.	While	 they	have	 set	 the	 bar	 high,30	
they	have	also	reinforced	the	belief	that	an	
international	 ban	 on	 something,	 not	 just	
clean-up	measures,	is	now	possible.	The	final	
ban	text	has	been	adopted	by	both	houses	of	
parliament	in	Belgium	as	of	this	writing.
While	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 ban	 is	
in	 Belgium	 (Austria	 is	 entering	 a	 parlia-
mentary	debate	on	a	 clusters	moratorium),	
several	other	states	have	made	their	reserva-
tions	known:	“Australia,	Belgium,	Canada,	
Denmark,	 France,	 Germany,	 Greece,	
Italy,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Norway,31	 Poland,	
Switzerland,	 the	United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	
United	States	have	plans	 to	withdraw	from	
service	 or	 have	 destroyed	 certain	 types	 of	
cluster	munitions.”32	Germany	and	Belgium	
are	considering	a	 strategy	of	narrowing	the	
definition	of	cluster	munitions	so	that	a	ban	
excludes	 advanced	models	 that	 are	 not	 ex-
pected	to	be	problematic.33	The	United	States	
is	not	Belgium,	but	even	the	U.S.	military,	
having	distributed	its	own	task-force	report	
in	 advance	 of	 the	CCW,	 seems	 to	 be	will-
ing	to	consider	major	changes	in	its	arsenal.	
For	the	first	time	in	a	long	time,	a	significant	
international	 restriction	 on	 certain	 cluster	
munitions	appears	to	be	within	reach.
Continuing Debates
From	 the	 start,	 many	 ICBL	 campaign-
ers	 had	 difficulty	 condoning	 technical	
measures	 to	 address	 high	 cluster-munition	
failure	 rates.	 They	 campaigned	 against	
self-destruction,	 self-deactivation	 and	 self-
neutralisation	solutions	for	APMs	and	worry	
that	 supporting	 technical	 fixes	 now	 may	
compromise	an	absolutist	principle	defended	
earlier.	However,	what	if	major	players	refuse	
to	join	an	all-out	ban	on	cluster	munitions,	
even	if	they	support	a	comprehensive	ban	on	
anti-personnel	mines?	
Controversy	 also	 surrounds	 the	 debate	
over	what	an	“acceptable”	failure	rate	might	
look	 like.	 Less	 than	 1-percent	 failure	 is	 a	
typical	cut-off	point,	but	is	also	arbitrary.	A	
very	 small	percentage	of	 a	 very	 large	num-
ber	 can	 still	 be	 a	 humanitarian	 disaster,	
albeit	 a	 much-reduced	 danger	 compared	
with	 that	produced	by	 a	10-	 to	30-percent	
failure	rate.
Yet,	 there	may	be	a	harm-reduction	im-
perative	to	prioritising	destruction	of	certain	
more	problematic	“worst	culprit”	munitions,	
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whatever	 the	 future	 holds	 for	 a	 complete	
ban.	 There	 is	 consensus	 within	 the	 CMC	
for	 a	 moratorium	 on	 use,	 production	 and	
trade	 of	 cluster	 munitions	 until	 their	 hu-
manitarian	 problems	 have	 been	 resolved—
but	 not	 everyone	 has	 been	 in	 favour	 of	
prioritising.3	Does	highlighting	the	bulk	of	
the	problem	legitimate	what	remains?	Some	
worry	that	humanitarian	law	will	be	ignored	
and	they	have	suggested	that	cluster	muni-
tions	might	 be	 used	more	 indiscriminately	
if	 their	 failure	 rates	 are	 “fixed.”	Will	mili-
taries	switch	to	other	bombs,	causing	more	
casualties,	 if	 cluster	 munitions	 are	 bann-	
ed	entirely?3
An	 interesting	 reverse-onus	 framework	
outlined	 by	 Landmine	 Action	 (UK)	 and	
consistent	 with	 one	 of	 the	 conclusions	 of	
the	McCormack	report	is	that	governments	
should	 recognise	 all	 cluster	 munitions	 are	
assumed	prohibited	unless	users	can	“opt	in”	
with	a	guarantee	that	a	particular	munition	
can	be	used	safely.36	Might	that	approach	fit	
nicely	with	the	destruction	of	legacy	muni-
tions	with	the	highest	failure	rates?	
A	final	point:	If	the	failure	rates	of	cluster	
munitions	were	reduced	to	nil	or	next	to	nil,	
would	there	remain	a	humanitarian	problem	
on	 a	 scale	 sufficient	 to	 sustain	 a	 campaign	
for	a	comprehensive	international	ban?
See Endnotes,” page 110
Near Erbil, Iraq: the CBU was released at too low an altitude and these BLU-97 submunitions hit the ground 
without arming. Their damaged state makes them unpredictable and very dangerous.
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artillery.	Aerial	bombardments	would	
suggest	 the	 need	 to	 be	 conscious	 of	
larger	 ordnance	 and	 the	 possibility	
of	submunitions.
•	 What	was	the	intensity	and	duration	
of	the	campaign?	A	lengthy	campaign	
means	 the	 likelihood	 of	 a	 greater	
number	of	ERW	being	present.
•	 Did	the	contested	land	change	hands?	
It	 is	 the	 experience	 of	 UNMEE	
MACC	 that	 contested	 areas	 that	
changed	 hands	 resulted	 in	 many	 of	
the	mines	 laid	by	one	 side	being	 re-
covered	and	re-laid	in	other	areas	by	
the	new	owners.
•	 What	are	the	items	of	ERW	encoun-
tered	in	operations	to	date?	This	will	
determine	 the	 level	 of	 expertise	 re-
quired	by	the	clearance	organisation	
to	deal	with	likely	finds	as	the	clear-
ance	operation	encounters	the	items.	
Depending	 on	 the	 number	 found	
and	their	frequency,	these	specialised	
personnel	may	need	to	remain	on-site	
or	 be	 within	 close	 proximity	 to	 the	
operation	while	it	is	in	progress.	The	
items	of	ERW	will	also	determine	the	
type	of	equipment	used	to	dispose	of	
these	items.6
•	 The	 area	 itself	 will	 need	 to	 be	 re-
viewed.	 If	 it	 is	 inhabited,	 the	 prox-
imity	 of	 any	 discoveries	 of	 larger	
ordnance,	 in	 particular,	will	 present	
additional	considerations	to	the	clear-
ance	operation.	Should	the	item(s)	be	
destroyed	 in situ	 or	 removed?	 If	 the	
item(s)	cannot	be	moved	due	to	lack	
of	 specialised	 equipment,	what	mea-
sures	need	to	be	adopted	to	mitigate	
the	effects	of	destroying	the	item(s)?7
•	 Abandoned	 military	 vehicles	 need	
to	 be	 checked	 for	 ammunition	 and	
other	 explosive	 devices.	 Approaches	
to	 the	vehicles	need	to	be	physically	
cleared	 to	 eliminate	 the	 possibility	
of	mines.	The	presence	of	any	poten-
tially	hazardous	 substances	needs	 to	
be	considered	also.
Conclusion
The	experience	of	the	UNMEE	MACC	
is	 that	 mines	 and	 conventional	 ERW	 are	
an	 interwoven	 part	 of	 many	 clearance	 op-
erations.	However,	 it	 is	essential	 to	factor	a	
worst-case	scenario	into	any	plan.	The	types	
of	ERW	encountered	will	determine	the	lev-
el	of	expertise	required	to	complete	the	task	
and	deal	with	any	finds	 in	the	course	of	 it.	
It	is	important	that	any	clearance	operation	
have	 adequately	 trained	 personnel	 to	 deal	
with	ERW	likely	 to	be	encountered	during	
the	course	of	any	task.	
Staff members of the UNMEE MACC pro-
vided valuable assistance in the preparation of 
this article. 
For additional references and further 
reading for this article, please visit http://
maic.jmu.edu/journal /10.1/feature/kudyba/
kudyba.htm/#addlrefs.
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30,000 Square Meters Demined in Angola
Instituto Nacional de Desminagem (The National Institute for Demining) in Angola recently 
announced it has demined more than 30,000 square meters (7.41 acres) of mine-affected land 
in the country. INAD reported 12 anti-personnel mines, one anti-tank mine, 206 mortar 
shells and various other explosive devices were destroyed as part of the clearance. 
Fields demined by INAD were given to local populations for farming and other agricultural 
pursuits. The organization has begun reconnaissance work to locate and identify more 
mined areas in need of clearance. 
first	establishing	the	history	of	the	area	and	
what	military	 actions	 occurred	 there.	This	
problem	 presents	 challenges	 to	 demining	
and	 explosive-ordnance-disposal	 teams	 op-
erating	within	the	UNMEE	area.	Deminers	
conducting	 clearance	 operations	 sometimes	
encounter	UXO	and	other	ERW,	including	
abandoned	 military	 vehicles	 with	 live	 am-
munition	still	on	board.	For	example,	during	
battle-area	 clearance,	 a	 number	 of	 vehicles	
with	live	ammunition	scattered	around	them	
were	found.	The	vehicles	had	been	set	on	fire	
by	retreating	forces	and	the	contents	explod-
ed,	 scattering	 the	 ammunition	 around	 the	
burning	vehicles.	In	such	cases,	a	path	has	to	
be	cleared	up	to	and	around	the	vehicles	to	
enable	teams	to	work	safely.
Demining	 operations	 within	 a	 post-
conflict	 situation	 involving	 all	 aspects	 of	
conventional	 war	 scenarios	 will	 generally	
encounter	 a	 mixed	 threat	 of	 both	 mines	
and	ERW	in	areas	where	battles	have	taken	
place	 and	ground	was	 contested.	As	battle	
conditions	 develop,	 the	 area	 will	 become	
littered	with	ERW	of	every	imaginable	de-
scription,	 in	particular	when	the	attacking	
force	 seeks	 to	 dislodge	 the	 defenders.	 It	 is	
inevitable	 that	 a	 percentage	 of	 the	 muni-
tions	 directed	 at	 either	 side	 would	 fail	 to	
function,	either	through	accident	or	by	de-
sign.	Disabled	or	destroyed	tanks	and	other	
vehicles	with	supplies	of	ammunition	pres-
ent	further	challenges.
Problems Confronting the 
Clearance Operation
A	scenario	of	this	type	presents	addition-
al	problems	to	the	clearing	agency.	What	is	
perceived	as	the	greater	danger—the	mined	
ground	or	the	littered	ERW?	In	many	cases,	
local	 shepherds	herding	 their	 animals	have	
encountered	UXO	lying	on	the	ground	and	
resorted	to	throwing	stones	at	it,	through	ei-
ther	idle	curiosity	or	sheer	boredom.	Stones	
landing	 on	 nearby	 mines	 have	 caused	 the	
items	to	explode.
Locals	scavenging	among	ERW	for	items	
that	can	be	recovered	for	sale,	such	as	copper	
and	brass,	enter	mined	areas	 in	 their	quest	
for	such	items	out	of	economic	necessity.2	In	
many	cases	these	people	are	killed	or	injured.	
Emergency	rescue	measures,	usually	under-
taken	by	demining	organisations	working	in	
the	area,	need	to	be	conducted	immediately	
to	recover	the	victim,	or	other	locals	will	at-
tempt	an	impromptu	rescue	operation,	often	
with	 equally	 tragic	 results.	 Being	 involved	
in	the	recovery	operation	can	be	a	traumatic	
experience	for	many	personnel.3	
In	some	cases,	clearance	operations	can	
be	 disrupted	 when	 demining	 teams	 lack	
suitably	 cross-trained,	 qualified	 personnel	
to	remove	or	disarm	UXO	and	ERW	in	con-
junction	with	any	mines	encountered	within	
the	clearance	area.
ERW Encountered within UNMEE
Most	 conventional	 ERW	 items	 encoun-
tered	within	the	UNMEE’s	operations	consist	
of	small-arms	ammunition,	mortars,	artillery	
shells	to	1	mm	and	Boevaya Mashina/rocket-
propelled	grenade-type	 rockets.	These	 items	
have	 caused	 a	 number	 of	 casualties	 among	
the	 local	 population	 living	 within	 the	 TSZ	
and	adjacent	areas.	Often	 the	casualties	 are	
children,	who	are	curious	by	nature	and	play	
with	the	items	they	encounter.	These	items,	
although	 usually	 small,	 can	 inflict	 quite	
horrific	 injuries	 to	 the	 child.	 A	 number	 of	
submunitions	 and	 aerial	 bombs	 have	 also	
been	 encountered	 during	 field	 operations.	
Submunitions	have	streamers	and	are	an	at-
tractive	shape	and	colour	that	readily	attract	
a	child’s	curiosity.	
Table	1	gives	an	overview	of	ERW	items	
encountered	within	the	UNMEE.
Clearance Operations 
Recommendations
As	 a	 result	 of	 identifying	 and	 mitigat-
ing	the	ERW	problems	in	Eritrea,	UNMEE	
MACC	 has	 several	 recommendations	 for	
developing	 a	 good	 clearance	 operation.	 A	
thorough	investigation	is	critical.	A	great	deal	
of	the	information	can	be	gleaned	from	dis-
cussions	with	various	parties,	including	local	
inhabitants,	militia,	police	and	military	per-
sonnel.	Past	operational	reports	from	the	area	
will	also	be	of	assistance.	If	the	region	was	the	
subject	of	an	Impact	Survey	and/or	Technical	
Survey,	 it	 is	 also	 extremely	 important	 to	
consult	 the	 data	 presented	 in	 these	 reports.	
The	 clearance	 operation	 should	 examine	
the	following:
•	 What	is	the	history	of	the	area?
•	 What	 forces	 and	 equipment	 were	
involved?	 This	 will	 give	 an	 indica-
tion	 of	 the	 types	 of	 ERW	 likely	 to	
be	 encountered.	 For	 example,	 tanks	
and	 artillery	 will	 mean	 larger	 ERW;	
submunitions	 can	 be	 delivered	 by	
ERW Item
Recorded in Incident* and 
Quantity Found Following 
Incidents
F1	hand	grenade	 Yes—2	
Chinese	wooden	HG	(type	unknown) Yes—1	
M	7	Yugoslav	HG	frag	 Yes—1	
F1	HG	fuse	 Yes—3	
Russian	HG	RGK3	 Yes—1	
RPG	rocket	 Yes—2	
A	fuse	from	an	RPG	rocket	 Yes—1	
Anti-aircraft	bullet	 Yes—1	
POMZ	 Yes—1	
PMN	 Yes—2	
TM-6	 Yes—	
TM-7	 Yes—1	
Belgian	plastic	PRBM3	 Yes—13
Czechoslovakian	PT-MI-BA	III	 Yes—1	
Unidentified	HG Yes—3	
Unidentified	UXO Yes—	
Unidentified	AT	mine Yes—2
Unidentified	explosive	 Yes—1	
TOTAL 67	
Table 1: ERW Encountered in the UNMEE. 
*Source: UNMEE MACC Preliminary Investigation Reports 2001–2005
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